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WHAT WAS THE ASSEMBLY LINE ?
DAVID E. NYE
INTRODUCTION
Today, ”assembly line” immediately suggests Asian or Latin-American factories 
where poorly-paid workers make consumer goods for export to the West. For 
example, many US corporations shifted jobs to northern Mexico beginning in 
1965 as part of the Border Industrialization Program. This process accelerated 
dramatically after January 1, 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) went into effect. It abolished tariffs and made re-importation of assembly 
line goods easy. By 2000, 1.2 million US jobs had been relocated to Mexico. Most 
of the Mexicans hired were semi-skilled women, preferred both for their manual 
dexterity and their willingness to accept low wages.1 Corporations built factories 
where environmental legislation was lax and unions were weak or non-existent. 
In such places, “the danger is that repression rather than innovation becomes a 
competitive advantage.”2 
 Yet if the assembly line of today is often part of a global production system for 
offshore, semi-skilled work, at its inception in 1913 the Americans saw the assembly 
line as the guarantor of high wages and domestic prosperity. This essay reviews the 
origins of the assembly line, what exactly it was as a technology, and how it was 
initially understood. In hindsight, it was less a beginning than a mid-point in long-
term developments that are still underway. 
 Historians frequently refer to the assembly line as an historical stage, in a sequence 
from Taylorism to Fordism to “post-Fordism,” with additional stages sometimes 
included such as “ lexible production,” “lean production” and most recently “post-
lean production.”3 As convenient as these historical stages once seemed, their 
proliferation suggests that the whole notion of a sequence was mistaken to begin 
with. Indeed, many historians of technology no longer write about a sequence of 
stages.4 Moreover, the public response to the assembly line in the years 1913 to 
1920 suggests that it was not seen as a radical break with previous factory systems, 
but rather as the culmination of decades of incremental changes in manufacturing. 
Nor did the assembly line emerge out of, or replace, Taylor’s scienti ic management. 
1 Livingston 2004, 59-76.
2 Shaiken 2009, 56; Klein 1999.
3 Among the myriad writers to use “Fordism” to refer to the assembly line, see Burrows 1992, or 
Tolliday and Zeitlin 1987. 
4 See, for example, Hounshell 1984 and Biggs 1996.
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Rather, it was part of a series of process (as opposed to product) innovations that 
began in the eighteenth century and that is still underway. 
ORIGINS
The assembly line emerged at the Ford Motor Company, whose new 1910 Highland 
Park Plant provided a setting conducive to manufacturing innovation. No single 
individual invented the assembly line. It was a collaboration between many people, 
who drew on knowledge acquired in many different industries. A leading scholar 
in the study of technology, Anthony F. C. Wallace, concluded after a lifetime of 
research: 
We shall view technology as a social product and shall not be over much interested in 
the priority claims of individual inventors, for the actual course of work that leads to 
the conception and use of new technology always involves a group that has worked for 
a considerable period of time on the basic idea before success is achieved.5 (Emphasis 
in original)
This generalization applies with particular force to both the assembly line and its 
eventual reconception as lean manufacturing. In each case, a group worked together 
for years to rethink the fundamental processes of production.
 Manufacturing processes that in hindsight look much like an assembly line can 
be found long before Henry Ford founded his company in 1903. The idea of moving 
work to the men, who remained in ixed locations along a line where each performed 
a single function, had been developed by slaughterhouses before the Civil War. 
Their “disassembly” lines began with live animals being driven into the building 
and ended with cuts of meat, hides, tallow, and other products.6 In a sense, Ford 
reversed this process. Another central element in any form of mass production is 
interchangeable parts, which were so widely used in the United States that Charles 
Fitch examined them in detail in his “Report on the Manufacture of Interchangeable 
Mechanism,” as part of the Tenth Census of the United States (1881). The canning 
industry’s continuous low production was another precursor to the assembly 
line, and historians have noted others, some of which Ford or his staff conceivably 
might have heard of, such as the Venetian arsenal’s production of ships or Josiah 
Wedgewood’s manufacture of pottery to a high and uniform standard. In the United 
States, before 1800 Oliver Evans devised gristmills with continuous low production 
that produced lour almost without the touch of a human hand. By 1804 the British 
Navy mass produced biscuits. Dough was mixed in “an ingenious machine” and the 
subsequent work was divided into six tasks, the last being to place the biscuits in a 
5  Wallace 2003, 3. 
6  Arms 1959.
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long oven, through which passed a conveyor. Out the other end came the biscuits, 70 
per minute. By the 1830s most of this process had been mechanized.7 
 Some historians, rather than search for manufacturing processes that pre igured 
the assembly line, trace the development of a new mentality amongst workers, 
engineers, and managers. Lindy Biggs studied the American pursuit of “the rational 
factory” from Oliver Evans and Thomas Jefferson in the late eighteenth century to the 
culmination of this quest in the Ford manufacturing system. Biggs was concerned 
not only with particular technologies but also with the development of a mentality 
in search of – and an incentive system that rewarded – each rationalization. For 
example, in the textile industry, “mill mechanics quickly learned that production 
enhancing innovations earned rewards, and these bright, skilled men had little 
trouble introducing regular changes that increased speed or lowered skill 
requirements.”8 Industries rationalized in different ways. The paper industry did not 
seek to lower wages but to increase productivity. The arms industry sought greater 
precision in order to make interchangeable parts. In contrast to these fabrication 
industries, processing industries such as steel making, canning, or oil re ining 
did not so much replace skilled workers as they accelerated the low of materials. 
More generally, Biggs documents how in the last decades of the nineteenth century 
engineers invented what would now be called systems management, including 
cost accounting, inventory control, incentive wages, and standardization of work 
routines. Labor-saving machinery, accelerated materials handing, and systems 
management all came together in the Ford assembly line, which culminated a 
century of effort. 
 Seen in this way, the assembly line was not unique, but rather part of a long-
term process of improving ef iciency. Indeed, this seems to be how Americans 
irst regarded the assembly line when they became aware of it. At irst the term 
“assembly line” was only used in the technical press. A typical example from 1914 
in Engineering Magazine runs, “ inishing and assembling of front-axle components 
shows how labor-costs may be [...] reduced [...] by the use of sliding assembly lines, 
chain-driven for the inal assembling, but having the partial assemblies moved by 
hand.”9 In contrast, the New York Times did not quickly adopt the phrase “assembly 
line”. In January 1914 it published a full-page story on the Ford Motor Company, 
including six photographs. None was of an assembly line, and the new system of 
production was neither named nor was it the focus of the story. The irst mention 
of the new manufacturing system by name in the Times did not come until as late 
as 1923, in an article about Studebaker.10 Contrary to what one might expect, the 
7 Giedion 1948, 87-90.
8 Biggs 1996, 17.
9 Arnold 1914, 858.
10 Based on a search using the New York Times search engine, “assembly line” irst appeared in 
“High Motor Value at Low Prices Attained in Quantity Production,” January 7, 1923.
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phrase “assembly line” was not widely used between 1914 and 1920. This in itself 
suggests that the public did not perceive a radical break with the past, but rather a 
continuation of improvements in ef iciencies. For example, in the 1860s petroleum 
producers developed continuous process systems that tripled output while 
cutting costs in half. By the end of that decade the Bessemer process enabled steel 
production to speed up, and in the 1870s iron, copper, zinc, and glass companies 
also adopted continuous process technologies.11 By 1908 sheets of glass could be 
rolled out in any size desired.12 By 1913 Americans had come to expect enormous 
improvements in manufacturing ef iciency, and the assembly line was but one more 
example of a trend.
 Robert Friedel has found that “a culture of improvement” characterized western 
societies for at least a millennium. He argues that from the eleventh century 
onwards incremental improvements and the sharing of knowledge account for the 
West’s mechanization and industrialization. In the case of the assembly line, he 
notes, it “was not, apparently, the result of some sort of overarching plan to reform 
manufacture. It instead grew out of the Ford engineers’ effort to reduce perceived 
inef iciencies – their pursuit of step-by-step improvement of the production 
process.”13 The ability to perceive inef iciencies itself was the cultural outcome of 
centuries of hard-won practical knowledge from many industries. Those working 
at the Ford Motor Company when the assembly line was created had experience in 
arms manufacturing, bicycle production, meatpacking, steel making, and brewing. 
The assembly line synthesized practices from each of these, and became more 
than the sum of its parts. It thus exempli ies Wallace’s observation that inventions 
emerge from a group, illustrates Friedel’s argument that even the most important 
innovations are created incrementally, and offers the logical conclusion to Biggs’s 
study of the how the rational factory evolved.
 The most important study of the evolution of US manufacturing methods remains 
David Hounshell’s From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932.14 
To explain the emergence of the assembly line, he traced, in case studies based 
on archival sources, the manufacture of sewing machines, several woodworking 
companies (including the Studebaker wagon works), the McCormick reaper 
factory, and several bicycle manufacturers. As the list of case studies suggests, 
Hounshell focused on fabrication industries that produced complex machines. 
In these industries developed the division of labor, specialized machine design, 
metal stamping (rather than casting), rationalization of work low, and improved 
shop layouts that would converge in the assembly line. Most industries moved 
only haltingly toward fully rationalized production. Neither the Singer Sewing 
11  Beniger 1986, 246.
12  Boorstin 1974, 343.
13  Friedel 2007, 471.
14  Hounshell 1984
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Machine Company nor the McCormick reaper works, for example, adopted the 
New England armory practice of specialized single-function machines or the goal 
of fully interchangeable parts until they had been in operation for decades. What 
forced them to change? Not abstract logic but the pressure of increased sales. The 
woodworking and furniture industries incorporated many elements of production 
that eventually were used in the assembly line. However, because consumers 
wanted variety and because styles changed often, their “product lines could not be 
maintained long enough to justify the construction of special purpose machinery 
and other ‘ef icient’ production techniques.”15 The Pope Bicycle Company continued 
to hand forge many parts until near the end of the century, and it did not solve 
the problem of ef icient assembly before demand for its high wheel cycles declined. 
In short, each of these industries contributed to the eventual emergence of the 
assembly line, but none managed to integrate all the separate improvements into 
a new system of production. Part of the reason for this was the form of the factory 
itself.
CONTEXT
What was the physical context for the invention of the assembly line? With few 
exceptions, the factories of c. 1900 were steam-powered and had a completely 
different architecture than an assembly-line plant. A steam-powered facility was 
almost always built several stories high, with the power source centrally located 
on one of the lower loors. The power moved to the machines by gears, line shafts, 
and belts, and machines had to be arranged in straight rows to get power from the 
overhead drive shafts. Because power was transmitted as physical movement, a 
great deal of power was required just to run the transmission system itself. The 
larger a factory became, the greater the investment in shafts, belts, and gears and 
the more power had to be used to turn them. Practically speaking, in a really large 
plant it was necessary to build and maintain several power systems, with power 
radiating outwards from each. 
 Electric drive transformed the architectural possibilities. A factory that relied 
on electric motors could be built in any size and shape, and laid out according 
to the nature of the work. However, electric generation only became available in 
the 1880s, and reliable motors did not exist until the 1890s. As late as 1900, only 
3.6% of factory power came from electric motors, rising to 18.7% a decade later.16 
Furthermore, many of the early electric motors were simply attached to the overhead 
drive shafts that already existed, or they were rigged up to drive a small cluster of 
machines. To build an assembly line required a further step. Every machine needed 
to have its own motor before they could be moved into more ef icient positions, no 
longer dependent on external power sources such as drive shafts, gears, and belts. 
15  Ibid.,151.
16  Duboff 1979, 82.
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Likewise, once transmitting power over a distance ceased to be a problem, factories 
did not need to be multi-storied structures with the power source in the middle. 
A sprawling single-story structure was often best suited to materials handling. 
Production was further accelerated by electric cranes, elevators, ventilation, and 
illumination, which together made possible a building of any size, height, or shape. 
With electric lighting there was no need to halt production because of darkness, and 
a factory could operate day and night if demand warranted it. Individually, each of 
these changes accelerated production. Collectively, they were preconditions for the 
assembly line.
 While the components of the assembly line all preceded it, there seems no doubt 
that their integration irst occurred in Henry Ford’s factory between 1908 and 1913. 
Electrical drive spread quickly in fast-growing new industries such as automobile 
factories. They were a likely place for production innovation because the demand 
for cars continually outraced supply. Furthermore, automobiles were suited to 
developing something like an assembly line because they were made from a large 
number of parts. The Model T contained about 10,000, and the number increased 
somewhat between 1908 and 1916. In the early years workmen built stationary 
cars up from the loor, starting with the wheels and chassis and moving each part to 
the embryonic car. Each team of workmen had to be familiar with a large number 
of operations and procedures. This system wasted time as workers moved about a 
large loor looking for parts, and it created chronic inventory and supply problems. 
It was impossible to keep all the parts close to all the cars under construction. As 
orders for new cars poured in, the search for more ef icient methods intensi ied. 
One possibility was to create teams of workers that each had a certain specialty 
and send them around from one car under construction to the next. But specialized 
crews were only slightly more ef icient, as it was still dif icult to keep all the parts 
that each crew needed nearby, and at times they had to wait for another crew 
to complete its operations. It was clearly more ef icient to move the parts to the 
men, who stayed in place, and to subdivide the work. However, moving parts and 
materials continuously was dif icult in a traditional factory building. 
 In order to produce a standardized car aimed at the largest possible market, 
Henry Ford built a new factory at Highland Park in Detroit. It opened on January 
1, 1910. It was not designed with the assembly line in mind, but it was a new 
kind of facility, built on the assumption that electrical light and power should be 
available everywhere. The factory’s loor plan was more open and lexible than 
older facilities. The buildings spread over a large area, providing managers with a 
space that encouraged innovation. Good lighting facilitated precision work, which 
was essential in order to achieve the exacting standardization needed to make 
interchangeable parts. Ventilation was just as important, as dust makes machines 
malfunction when working at close tolerances. At Highland Park electric fans swept 
out eleven million cubic feet of air every twenty- ive minutes. Dust was extracted 
from the air by passing it through a heavy mist. The air was then dried and pumped 
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into work areas. Pure air improved worker health, and it kept machinery cleaner 
and more accurate.
 In this new facility, managers and engineers came together who collectively 
knew most of the manufacturing practices used in the United States. So many 
different people were involved that it is impossible to be sure who originated the 
idea. Ford’s precise role in the invention of the assembly line is also unclear. He had 
worked as an electric power-plant engineer for Detroit Edison, as a mechanic in 
machine shops, and as a watch repairman, giving him experience with electricity, 
mechanics, and precision work. He certainly grasped the importance of both electric 
drive and interchangeable parts. At the least, Ford deserves credit for his support 
of the process of experimentation itself, which included many discussions with his 
staff. He also deserves credit for recognizing that automobiles could sell to a mass 
market if prices were greatly reduced. But Ford also hired talented managers who 
made major contributions to the assembly line. Some of them were machinists that 
had started out as workers. As Hounshell demonstrated, collectively they had an 
enormous expertise. To take just a few examples, the Yankee mechanic William 
Flanders knew the sewing machine business and championed interchangeable 
parts and single function machine tools. Max Wollering had worked for International 
Harvester and a gas engine company. Oscar C. Bornholdt had direct experience 
with canning and food processing. William Klann had worked as a machinist in 
lourmills and breweries. A whole crew of experts at punching and stamping steel 
moved to Detroit when Ford bought their company in 1911, including William 
Knudsen, who later directed several assembly line plants and eventually left for 
General Motors, where he became president. Another Ford manager, P. E. Martin, 
toured Chicago meat packing plants to garner new ideas for automobile assembly.17 
These men and many others together created the assembly line so rapidly that 
precisely who contributed which idea or implemented what process at what date 
may forever elude historians. They were too busy to make notes at the time, and 
many changes occurred simultaneously. However, if it is impossible to determine 
the precise contribution of each, it appears that Ford himself did not irst conceive 
of the assembly line. Consider the testimony of Richard Kroll. He worked at the 
Piquette Plant, made the move to Highland Park, and was personally involved in the 
development of the assembly line. Kroll declared in an interview years later: “I don’t 
know who thought up the idea of putting the whole car on a moving line.” Yet he did 
recall “Mr. Ford didn’t like it at irst. He went on a trip somewhere, and while he was 
on that trip, they put the line in.”18
17  Hounshell 1984, 220-228, 239-241.
18  Kroll 1955, 15-16.
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SIX DEFINING FEATURES
Rather than attempting to sort out the myriad personal contributions to the 
invention of the assembly line, it is far more useful to explain its six de ining features. 
One principle of the assembly line is the subdivision of labor, described as early as 
1776 in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, in a famous passage on the manufacture of 
pins. He noted that a person working alone could perhaps not make twenty pins in 
a day. Strict division of labor made an enormous difference in productivity. 
One man draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a fourth points 
it, a ifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two 
or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar business, to whiten the pins 
is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the important 
business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct 
operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands, 
though in others the same man will sometimes perform two or three of them.19
A team of ten or more people with only minimal skills together could produce 
and package 48,000 pins in a day. Smith noted that such enormous increases in 
productivity occurred in every industry where division of labor was introduced, 
and could be attributed irstly to “the increase of dexterity in every particular 
workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing 
from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number 
of machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and enable one man to do the work 
of many.”20 Smith also noted that such new specialized machines often were created 
or proposed by workmen who focused all their attention on a single operation. Its 
repetition led them to imagine better tools and physical arrangements.
 At the Ford Motor Company, managers subdivided work into many small 
operations of nearly equal duration. A study made in 1952 found that the typical job 
on an assembly line consisted of performing one or two small tasks that together 
took two minutes. For the assembly line to work smoothly, it was important that the 
precise time needed for each task be calculated, so that the correct number of workers 
could be allocated to each station on the line. There was variation. Some jobs took 
less than a minute, and a few might require as long as eight minutes, including some 
walking along the line, but the norm in 1952 was two.21 (The evidence suggests that 
on the 1914 line the typical job took less time). To keep the line moving steadily, four 
times as many men were needed for eight-minute tasks as for those that took only 
two minutes. Another advantage of making the tasks brief was that every job could 
be learned quickly. Not only could virtually anyone work at Ford, but also workers 
19  Smith 1776, Book 1, Chapter 1.
20  Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 1.
21  Walker and Guest 1952, 12.
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could be moved around depending on need. Skills were no longer important, as 
most jobs could be learned immediately, with almost no training. Indeed, managers 
found that people who were blind or had disabilities could do certain jobs just as 
well as anyone else. The company made a comprehensive analysis and found that 
there were 7,882 different jobs in the factory. Of these, only “949 were classi ied 
as heavy work requiring strong, able-bodied” men. Another 3,338 jobs could be 
done by anyone in ordinary physical condition. But the “remaining 3,595 jobs were 
disclosed as requiring no physical exertion and could be performed by the slightest, 
weakest sort of men.”22 In fact, 670 could be done by men with no legs, 2,637 by 
men with only one leg, 715 by one-armed men and 2 by men with no arms. Based 
on this analysis, Ford argued in his autobiography that the greater the subdivision 
of industry the more likely there would be work for everyone. He did not say, but 
surely knew, that workers who were blind or one-legged seldom quit. Healthy 
workers without disabilities were likely to lee the repetition of the assembly line. 
However, the most talented of them often escaped the monotony into skilled work, 
as the line itself had to be built, kept in repair, and constantly improved.
 A second idea essential to the assembly line was interchangeable parts. 
Identical parts had to it smoothly together without the need for any last-minute 
adjustments such as sanding or iling or polishing. The origin of this idea can be 
traced back at least to the early eighteenth century. As Ken Adler has noted, “In the 
1720s, Christopher Polhem, a Swedish inventor, manufactured clocks composed 
of interchangeable parts.” In France a locksmith did something similar. By the end 
of the eighteenth century, one private French manufacturer was able to produce 
10,000 gunlocks a year, through a process that divided labor into 128 separate 
steps.23 In the United States, Eli Whitney promoted the idea of interchangeability, 
but did not achieve impressive results.24 Whitney convinced Thomas Jefferson 
of the advantages of interchangeable parts for the production of weapons, and 
received a contract to realize the idea in practice. However, he proved unable to 
make metal parts to the exacting precision required. The idea was pursued in 
American armories, clock makers, and other manufacturers, and it was gradually 
realized during the nineteenth century. Interchangeable-part manufacture required 
such high standards of precision, however, that for generations it cost more than 
older methods of production, which in some industries remained competitive until 
well after the 1860s. Yet continual small improvements in machine-tool accuracy 
made parts more exactly alike and cheaper to produce. Ford managers achieved 
the necessary standards of precision partly by adopting the armory practice that 
each machine should perform only one function. A machine tool could be adjusted 
to make an almost in inite range of parts, but much time was needed to make 
22  Ford 1922, 108.
23  Alder 1997, 297, 301-302.
24  Smith 1981, 45-61.
68
each adjustment. For assembly lines to be ef icient, each machine was designed to 
perform only one thing, and to do that as quickly as possible. Furthermore, as the 
scale of production increased it became economically advantageous to invest larger 
sums in such machines, including some that no small manufacturer could afford. At 
Ford, the value of plant and equipment almost doubled between 1909 and 1917, 
when it reached $1606 per employee.25
 Single function machines themselves were necessary but they were not suf icient 
to make parts that were precisely identical. To improve precision, electric drive was 
needed. Mechanically driven shafts inevitably had a tiny wobble that imparted a 
slightly different speed to machines further away from the power source. Likewise, 
a drive shaft moved slightly irregularly. It turned more slowly when more belts were 
engaged to drive machines, and as one specialist noted, “each shaft oscillates, each 
belt slips and creeps” and the “variation of speed caused by one class of machinery 
is re lected to the other machines all over the mill.”26 These slight variations in the 
speeds of different machines along the line translated into slight variations in the 
products they manufactured. It was dif icult to make absolutely standardized parts 
without electric drive in each machine, which provided a reliable standardization of 
speeds and work performance. Likewise, the use of electrical heating spoiled fewer 
materials than other kinds of heat and speeded up steps in the assembly process, 
such as drying paint on individual parts. Overall, electri ication permitted a higher 
and more predictable standard of parts production. 
 A fourth idea that Ford managers developed also originated with arms 
production: that machines should not be grouped by type (e.g. all punch presses 
together) but arranged according to the sequence of work needed to create each 
product. Ford could rearrange production in this way because machines driven by 
electricity could be placed in any order on the shop loor. Furthermore, stronger 
construction techniques made it possible for Ford to place heavy machinery and 
even a foundry on the top loors of its 1914 Highland Park shops. Before then, the 
weight of machinery and the problem of vibrations had made it advisable to place 
this work on the lowest loor. The new arrangement meant that the upper loors 
fashioned raw materials into parts that then “ lowed” to sub-assembly lines on 
lower loors, before arriving at the main assembly line on the ground loor. Each 
completed car could then be driven right out of the building into the parking lot.27 
These changes had immediate effects. The leap in productivity in 1911 alone was 
phenomenal, as the new plant made it possible almost to double the number of 
cars being produced per man.28 Thus two years before the assembly line was put 
into place, the adoption of four of its ive major features – subdivision of labor, 
25  Williams, et al. 1998, 225.
26  Woodhouse 1910, 30.
27  Biggs 1996, 123-125. On Ford architecture, see Ling 1990, 127-167.
28  Williams, et al. 1993, 74.
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interchangeable parts, single-function machines, and the sequential ordering of 
machines – doubled productivity.
 Much of the productivity improvement realized at Highland Park was 
achieved through more ef icient in-house production of parts. In the irst years of 
manufacturing the Model T the cost of buying parts from outside suppliers was high. 
Fully two-thirds of the cost of parts was due to the inef icient production of (as well 
as the pro its made by) outside suppliers. At Highland Park Ford manufactured more 
of its own parts, and did so more cheaply than suppliers could, driving down the 
percentage of outside components in the Model T. One team of historians estimated 
that between 1909 and 1916 the cost of materials per vehicle (including raw 
materials and manufactured parts bought elsewhere) dropped by half from $590 
to $262.29 Moreover, the increased capability to produce parts in-house pressured 
remaining suppliers to lower prices or risk losing their contracts. By comparison, 
the cost of wages was a far less important factor in the inal cost of manufacturing a 
Model T, and remained relatively low at $64 to $70 a vehicle, except for higher costs 
during the year Ford moved into Highland Park.30 
 Fifth, this system worked even better if parts and sub-assemblies were moved 
automatically from one stage of production to the next. The most conspicuous 
elements of the assembly line – its gravity slides and continuous moving belts – 
are often mistakenly understood to be the most important ones. Before 1900, 
lourmills, bakeries, brewers, and cigarette companies operated continuous-
process machinery, particularly in conjunction with ovens. Ford himself had seen 
a striking application of materials processing and handling at Thomas Edison’s 
iron mining facility in Ogdensburg, New Jersey. Since Ford idolized the famous 
inventor, this example is particularly important as a precursor to the moving belts 
of the assembly line. Edison extracted iron from low-grade magnetite. His operation 
blasted ive-ton boulders out of a mountainside, smashed them into progressively 
smaller pieces, ground these into sand, and then pulled the iron particles out of that 
sand by pouring it past powerful magnets. To transport the progressively smaller 
stones Edison developed rubberized conveyor belts at the site in collaboration with 
Thomas Robbins, who set up his own company to manufacture vulcanized rubber 
belts in 1896. This mining site and mill was a suggestive precursor for the assembly 
line. Both integrated machines with moving rubber conveyors in a single overall 
plan that moved materials continuously.31 Based on it and the practices of brewers, 
meatpackers, canneries, and lour mills, Ford and his managers adopted gravity 
slides and the moving belt, which brought the task to the worker at the best possible 
height so as to eliminate heavy lifting, bending, eyestrain, or other discomfort. 
29  Ibid., 74.
30  Ibid., 76.
31  Nye 1983, 66-70.
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Just as importantly, the space of production shrank, as Ford’s managers sought to 
reduce in-process inventories and reduce the handling of materials to a minimum. 
For example, the distance traveled by the engine block was cut down spectacularly 
from 4000 feet to just 334 feet, and this reduced the number of partially completed 
engine blocks along the line by more than 85 percent.32 At the same time more than 
twenty jobs for hand-truckers were completely eliminated. Thus the assembly line 
was not only a matter of bringing the work to the worker, but of shrinking distances, 
automating movements, and reducing inventories.
 These ive practices – subdivision of labor, interchangeable parts, single-function 
machines, the sequential ordering of machines, and the movement of work to the 
man via slides and belts – together de ine the assembly line as a physical technology. 
A sixth factor, factory electri ication was a necessary precondition before these 
elements could be improved individually and welded together into a new form of 
production. Indeed, the value of electric lighting itself should not be overlooked. As 
late as the 1930s Ford managers found “that there is a direct relationship between 
the maintenance of adequate illumination and the production ef iciency of the 
various departments” so much so that lighting was seen as “another production 
tool which is just as important as are modern types of machine tool equipment.”33 
At the Highland Park Plant these practices all came together, making possible an 
immediate leap in productivity in 1911, with smaller increases in 1912 and 1913, 
followed by another leap in throughput in 1914, the irst year that the assembly line 
was in full operation.
 A corporation that adopted all of these practices to create an assembly line 
manufacturing system still needed to take on board another essential idea: make 
only one product and minimize changes in its design. Adam Smith’s pin makers and 
the British Navy had early grasped this idea. Likewise, The Ford Motor Company 
understood that if it made a variety of cars each would require its own assembly 
line, and each would need its own continuous stream of parts. Likewise, changing 
the model of any car would require closing down an entire assembly line for time-
consuming retooling. Therefore, Ford made only the Model T, though contrary to 
popular memory the color was not always or only black. Consumers could also 
choose between a hard metal top or a leather top that folded down behind the back 
seat, plus a few other options that varied from year to year.
 The assembly line eliminated waste motion and bottlenecks in production, and 
accelerated productivity. This was most obvious in the inal assembly. Using the 
older methods in 1909, assembling a single Model T required more than twelve 
hours of labor; by 1914 it took one hour and thirty-three minutes. To put this 
another way, the same number of workers could assemble 775% more automobiles 
in 1914. Looking only at inal assembly overstates the productivity of the assembly 
32  Williams, et al. 1992.
33  Barclay 1936, 205.
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line, however. Savings achieved in manufacturing individual parts were not as 
dramatic. On the other hand, the assembly line made monitoring individual worker 
performance easier. Responsibility for correct installation of each part was clear, 
and any slacking on the job quickly became a bottleneck in the low of production. 
The assembly line also reduced the thousands of spare parts that once had been 
lying around as loating inventories and thus saved the capital previously tied up 
in un-assembled parts. Because assembly lines sped up production and reduced 
inventories, companies that adopted them had a competitive advantage. The Ford 
Motor Company initially was the only one with this new production technology, 
and it could simultaneously undersell its competition, raise wages, and yet increase 
pro its. 
OTHER FACTORS IN THE ASSEMBLY LINE’S EMERGENCE
Knowing what the assembly line became after it was invented does not explain why 
the Ford Motor Company developed this new manufacturing system in the irst place. 
No master plan seemed to exist from the start, and no one imagined the inal result. 
Rather, Ford managers and engineers were struggling to make cars fast enough to 
meet accelerating demand. They looked for ef iciencies and discovered that simple 
changes in how workers moved or were positioned or received the materials they 
needed saved time. Along with these adjustments came subdivision of each job into 
many smaller tasks. For example, making a magneto took a single workman twenty 
minutes. The same task, subdivided and laid out along a moving line at the perfect 
height, could be done in only seven minutes. The idea of the assembly line seems to 
have emerged from such sub-assemblies of the more complicated individual parts. 
These lines fed into the larger production, which might be diagramed to look much 
like the skeleton of a ish, with all the lines leading into a central vertebra, where the 
cars were assembled.34 
 Yet it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the ultimate incentive for creating 
the assembly line was the apparently insatiable demand for the Model T itself. Had 
the public wanted only 50,000 new cars a year or less, then the many artisanal car 
manufacturers might have continued to serve that market. Mass production only 
made sense if there was mass demand. Ford not only understood this, he realized 
that he could stimulate demand by lowering the price. Against the advice of his 
own executives and stockholders, he continually reduced the price of the Model T, 
which in turn increased demand and made possible greater economies of scale in 
production. Eventually he bought out all the other stockholders, and no one could 
obstruct this policy. The price eventually fell to less than $300 for a new car in 
1926. 
34  On changes in scale, see Friedel 2007, 449-478.
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Greater volume production not only required more factories, it required new 
kinds of factories, and the series of plants that Ford built in the two decades after 
he founded his company 1903 traces the transformation of architecture that 
accompanied changes in production. First came the 1904 Piquette Avenue factory, 
which resembled a nineteenth-century textile mill building. It was three stories high, 
about as long as a football ield, including the two end zones, but only 12 meters 
wide. Built speci ically for manufacturing automobiles, it nevertheless was obsolete 
in only ive years, because it was suited to artisan laborers and the production 
of only a few thousand cars a year. By 1909 Ford was making 14,000 cars a year, 
and a larger facility with a different design was needed. The Highland Park plant 
was not designed with the assembly line in mind, as already noted, but it was far 
larger than the Piquette Plant. It was more open, facilitated materials handling, and 
provided electrical drive to all machinery. Here the assembly line was invented, 
incrementally, and production skyrocketed. In 1910-1911 it more than doubled to 
35,000. The following year it rose to 78,000, and by 1913-1914, when the assembly 
line was being installed, 248,000 cars rolled off the line. In response, Ford built 
another factory complex at Highland Park, the irst one built with the assembly line 
in mind. Biggs has rightly emphasized the importance of the 1914 Highland Park 
New Shop, as the irst rational factory.35 Completed in August, 1914, its two parallel 
buildings were each six stories tall, built with steel reinforced concrete. The New 
Shop was the full expression of the Ford assembly line. In the 1920s the Highland 
Park complex produced more cars every week than the Piquette Plant had been 
able to assemble during its best year. 36 
COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS
Two aspects of Ford’s assembly line have at times been misunderstood. The irst 
of these was the $5 day, introduced in 1914. This policy represented a doubling of 
what were then the ordinary wages of about $2.50. The Ford Company explained 
the higher wage as a form of pro it sharing; they paid workers more because in 
return they were making the assembly line so ef icient. But an important motive for 
the $5 Day was the desire to combat labor turnover that had risen to alarming levels 
by 1913. Higher pay encouraged workers to remain longer. Despite paying a higher 
wage, Ford pro its rose in 1914 by $4 million, and increased in 1915 by additional 
$8.5 million to $40.3 million.37 
 These pro its were achieved while prices fell. The Ford Motor Company lowered 
the price of the Model T by $50 in 1913 and $60 in 1914, even as wages increased. 
The price of a Model T fell from $950 to just $397 in 1921.38 The higher wage and 
35  Biggs 1996, 118-136.
36  On factory design, see Lewis, 2001, 666.
37  Raff and Summers, 1987, S75.
38  Ford 1922, 145; Casey 2003, 51. 
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the falling cost of the Model T made it possible for Ford workers themselves to 
purchase automobiles. Ford understood that mass production logically required 
mass consumption. In 1910 one of his workers typically made $2.50 per day, and a 
$950 automobile cost 380-days’ wages. In 1921 a new Model T cost only 80-days’ 
wages. A used car cost even less. 
 Ford conceived of the $5 Day as the link between production and consumption 
in a single marketplace. When wages doubled, consumption could rise accordingly. 
In contrast, more recently American and European corporations have outsourced 
manufacturing to low wage nations in Latin America, Asia, or Eastern Europe. The 
mass production worker in the developing world is not often seen as a potential 
consumer, and corporations maximize pro its by minimizing wages. In 1914 Ford 
might have done the same thing. Instead, he raised wages, increased productivity, 
and relentlessly drove down the price of his car in order to maximize the size of his 
market. By the early 1920s he was making half of the world’s automobiles.
 A second misconception regards the Model T itself, which is often seen as an 
unchanged vehicle from its introduction in 1908 until 15,000,000 had rolled out 
of the Ford factories in 1927. In fact, during the two decades of its production, the 
Model T underwent many changes. Notably, electric lights and an electric starter 
were added. The car’s styling underwent modest changes as well. In all, “the Model 
T underwent thousands of detail changes,”39 and it was a far better car in 1927 
than it had been in 1908. If the focus remained on improving the manufacturing 
process the Ford car did change, despite popular mythology to the contrary. Some 
parts of the car changed little, and these were at the core of the Model T, notably 
the transmission, the magneto, the 4-cylinder engine, and the suspension system. 
But the product was hardly static. In 1913 alone Ford made more than 100 design 
changes every month in the parts that went into the car. As those who purchase and 
restore a Model T quickly discover, the general appearance may be much the same 
from 1912 until 1927, but the model year does matter. For example, the electrical 
system was completely redesigned twice. Alterations were scarcely emphasized 
but introduced piecemeal rather than ballyhooed in annual models. Most changes 
were scarcely visible to the average customer. Thus the Ford assembly line did 
not require that the car’s design remain completely frozen, and it did incorporate 
improvements and small additions. 
OTHER FORMS OF PRODUCTION
Many have confused the assembly line with Frederick Winslow Taylor’s concept of 
scienti ic management. While both systems sought to rationalize work and improve 
ef iciency, they were not at all the same. Taylor’s system emerged irst and focused 
on making worker movements more ef icient. Instead of allowing workers to 
39  Casey 2003, 74.
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decide how they wished to tackle a task, such as shoveling, he determined the ideal 
weight that a man could lift, and then designed specialized shovels for each task, so 
that a shovel for moving sawdust lifted a greater volume than one for lifting sand. 
Taylor also regulated work routines, telling men when and how long they should 
relax and specifying how much work they should do. He examined the movements 
of the most ef icient workers, breaking them down into small sequences, Taylor 
determined “the best way” to perform a task and then retrained workers, so they 
could complete a job with the least possible effort and movement. To motivate 
workers to do more in the same time, Taylor relied upon incentives. There were 
normal wages for achieving a prescribed daily quota, with bonuses for exceeding 
the norm. Essentially, he modi ied the piece-rate system. Managers who worked 
in a similar spirit often used a stopwatch to establish how long each movement 
on every job should take. The scienti ic manager demanded that workers give up 
personal routines for standardized movements made with standardized tools and 
paid them according to an incentive system. Those who co-operated produced 
more. In return, Taylor expected employers to raise workers’ pay, though not all 
corporations adopted this part of his system. 
 Taylor reorganized entire factories, but aroused strong worker opposition. Hugh 
Aitkin found that workers at the Watertown Arsenal prevented Taylorism from 
going into effect. They demonstrated that they knew more about their tasks than 
those who attempted to reformulate them.40 Despite such setbacks, Taylor’s ideas 
circulated widely. His book The Principles of Scienti ic Management, sold widely in 
French, German, and Russian translations, and Lenin praised it. “Taylorism” had an 
enormous resonance beyond the factory in many areas, including home economics, 
education, and popular culture. Experts appeared in every area of life, proclaiming 
that they had discovered the “one best way” to arrange a kitchen, regulate traf ic 
low, or plan a community.
 Nothing could be further from Ford’s assembly line. Taylor designed ideal tools, 
such as different shovels for materials of different weight. Ford Motor Company 
abolished shoveling itself, in favor of electric cranes, moving belts, and other aids to 
continuous low manufacturing. Taylor retrained a worker to do the same job more 
ef iciently; the assembly line rede ined and simpli ied jobs. Taylor offered workers 
incentives to do piecework more quickly; Ford made piece rates pointless, because 
the assembly line paced the work, pushing everyone on the line to move at the same 
speed. Instead, workers received a high ixed wage. Taylor maximized ef iciency in 
existing production technologies; Ford transformed the means of production. Taylor 
saved time; Ford sped up time. In 1914, after Taylor put his system into operation at 
the Packard Motor Company, its 4,525 workers produced 2,984 cars a year. That was 
an annual production of only two-thirds of an automobile for each employee. This 
40  Aitken 1960, 268-271; Haber 1964.
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was still fabrication with artisan methods. In precisely the same year, 13,000 Ford 
employees, using conveyor belts, electric cranes, and 15,000 specialized machine 
tools, manufactured 260,000 cars, or twenty vehicles per man. Ford workers out-
performed those Taylor organized by three thousand percent. In just four days they 
assembled more automobiles than Packard constructed in an entire year. Taylor 
had maximized what was possible in the older artisan tradition. The assembly line 
was still in its infancy, and it had the potential to become far more productive. Often, 
people measured the productivity of the assembly line not by output per worker, 
but rather by how fast the cars were made. Before the assembly line, Ford workers 
used more than 12.5 hours (750 minutes) to assemble a car. Once the assembly line 
went into operation, it took less than 100 minutes.41 
 Because the manufacturing systems of Taylor and Ford differ so sharply, some 
historians have contended that they represent two distinct historical stages, 
“Taylorism” and “Fordism”. Implicit in such arguments is the idea that manufacturing 
as a whole evolves through distinct historical stages. However, Phillip Scranton has 
shown that this approach to manufacturing does not square with the complexity of 
historical fact. Rather than focus on large corporations such as Standard Oil, General 
Motors, Ford, and DuPont as the most advanced form of capitalism, in Endless 
Novelty Scranton examined irms with customized and small batch production. Far 
from being unpro itable businesses destined to be converted to Taylorism before 
adopting assembly lines, such companies remained inancially successful, and they 
proved just as important to an advanced economy as mass production. Companies 
fabricating elevators, turbines, switchboards, and precision instruments did 
not “fail” to become mass producers. Nor did they want to deskill labor. Rather, 
they prized skilled workmen who could respond lexibly to demand for varied 
goods. Such workers made possible the endless novelty that was the hallmark 
of the consumer society, and such companies were innovative and pro itable. 
Fredrick Winslow Taylor’s prescriptions were useful for repetitive movements 
for the production of identical things, but not for batch production of ine carpets, 
furniture, jewelry, cutlery, hats, and ready-to-wear clothing. Consumers wanted 
variety, and large pro its accrued to lexible irms with skilled workers that could 
supply endless novelties. Assembly lines were suited to making identical things, 
but many products of advanced technology had to meet customer requirements for 
installation at speci ic locations, and in the department stores customers wanted 
variety and novelty.
 Specialty production was not a sideshow. It grew just as fast as mass production, 
but it did so with different central actors. Instead of the “visible hand” of corporate 
managers advised by scienti ic experts, at the centre were skilled workers and 
technologically adept owners. When it suited them, they drew on new work systems, 
41  Nevins and Hill 1964, 474.
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of which Taylorism was only one. Instead of the rigidity of Taylor’s “one best way,” 
they valued lexibility. Instead of standardization of production at capital-intensive 
plants, they fostered diverse production at labor-intensive mid-sized factories, and 
these proved to be technologically innovative. In short, industry as a whole did not 
move through stages from artisan production to “Taylorism” to “Fordism.” There 
was no single path for successful corporate development. Rather, the assembly line 
was ideal for long runs of identical goods, but specialty production was ideal for 
higher end products that were distinctive and it could change rapidly to meet the 
demands of fashion. Likewise, large complex machines such as steam locomotives, 
elevators, switchboards, and the like had to be crafted to meet the needs of particular 
buyers. They were never produced in the numbers required to justify setting up an 
assembly line. Instead of a single path to development, there were many. 
 Nevertheless, the assembly line was extraordinarily productive compared to 
the craft labor assembly of cars that preceded it. Daniel M. G. Raff examined the 
Ford records from these years, and after making adjustments for changes in raw 
material prices and the cost of living, concluded that Ford was an extraordinary 
company compared to the rest of American industry between 1909 and 1914.42 
Its annualized productivity growth was an astounding 22%, compared to 1.5% in 
the economy as a whole. Many industries were almost stagnant, with productivity 
growth at less than 1%, including electrical machinery, durable goods, and textiles. 
Some entire industries actually became slightly less productive between 1909 and 
1919, including chemicals, furniture, and primary metals. Clearly the assembly line 
broke these patterns dramatically, and the productivity increases continued during 
the 1920s.
CONCLUSIONS
De ining the elements of the assembly line and demonstrating how it was different 
from Taylor’s scienti ic management does not explain how the assembly line came 
into being. The process of breaking down conventions, of throwing out inherited 
work routines, of building new equipment and arranging it in new ways, demanded 
a special atmosphere of experimentation and an exceptional openness to change. 
Just because the elements of the assembly line were all available does not mean that 
they would necessarily be combined. Had Ford behaved like all the other automobile 
manufacturers in 1910, his cars would have required more hours to make and 
cost the consumer more to buy. He would still have made a good deal of money. 
What drove the team of managers at Ford was not only pro its but also a vision 
of accelerated production and ef iciency that became an end in itself. In their own 
way they brie ly created a dynamic process of discussion, feedback, and continual 
improvement much like that designed into the lean production system created in 
42  Raff 1996, 183.
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Japan several generations later. This dynamic carried over from Highland Park to the 
creation of the River Rouge Plant, which was built around the Ford Motor Company’s 
evolving understanding of the most ef icient form of an assembly line. Rather than 
give the credit to Henry Ford himself for these developments, it is more accurate 
to say that he was the fortunate bene iciary of synergies among the exceptionally 
talented people he recruited. Ford gave those willing to buck conventions and try 
out new things the incentive and the authority to do so. In retrospect, something 
like the assembly line might seem the inevitable result when strong consumer 
demand stimulated managers to look for more ef icient manufacturing methods. 
But the assembly line could have emerged later, or somewhere else, making another 
product. It conceivably could have emerged sooner, perhaps in France where the 
goal of interchangeable parts was brie ly pursued in the late eighteenth century.43 
But technological innovations are not always remembered and therefore do not 
always accumulate. As Adler has emphasized “a technology (even a technology 
today accounted superior) can be rejected, discontinued, and forgotten.”44 This 
happened to the achievement of interchangeable parts production in France, where 
Napoleon reverted to the artisan production of the ancien regime. 
 In contrast, once the assembly line was up and running, it most certainly was 
not forgotten, but it has often been oversimpli ied and “mis-remembered.” Much 
of the cost savings achieved at the Ford Highland Park factory were not due to 
the introduction of the moving line itself, but resulted from ef iciencies realized 
through subdivision of labor, improved accuracy in making interchangeable parts, 
rearrangement of machinery, and better work- low layouts in an electri ied factory. 
More importantly, the assembly line is best understood not as a rigid system, nor 
as an imagined historical stage called “Fordism” following an equally imaginary 
“Taylorism.” Rather, the assembly line was (and is) an evolving processing 
technology that has become more ef icient during the century since its invention. 
In this perspective, “post-Fordism,” “lean production” and “post-lean production” 
are not new historical stages, but rather improved assembly lines. The abolition of 
“Fordism” as a historical stage and its de-coupling from “Taylorism” brings more 
complexity to corporate and labor history. It also awakens interest in specialized 
and lexible production systems that have coexisted with the assembly line from 
1913 until the present. This rede inition of the assembly line does not deny that 
mass production workers were deskilled and often exploited. Rather, it discloses 
the contribution workers could have made to increasing ef iciency and quality at an 
earlier date, if given the chance, as they eventually were in Japanese corporations. 
 
43 Adler 1997, 297-300.
44 Ibid., 310.
78
To see how and why these discoveries matter, a sketch of subsequent events is 
useful, even if detailed exploration of these matters cannot be undertaken here.45 
The creativity that led to inventing the assembly line was not sustained in the United 
States after the mid-1920s, as industry became “path dependent,” and no longer 
made many incremental improvements of the sort that had led to its discovery.46 
Instead, annual product design changes became paramount to convince consumers 
that their vehicles were becoming obsolete.47 American corporate managers also 
became fascinated with automation after World War II. From the 1950s until 
the 1970s, with extensive support from the Defense Department, research and 
development efforts focused on creating computer controlled assembly lines 
staffed by robots that could replace workers and operate around the clock.48 These 
investments resulted in few actual robots, however, as in the 1970s 99% of factory 
work continued to be done by human beings.49 The automation campaign further 
alienated workers, whose absenteeism and turnover had become “normal” in 
assembly line manufacturing by the 1970s.50 Labor’s disaffection made it dif icult 
for American corporations to adopt the lean production system and catch up with 
the Japanese manufacturers in the 1980s and 1990s, for “lean” companies rely 
on close cooperation between teams of workers and management.51 Hundreds 
of thousands of American jobs were lost to competing European and Japanese 
manufacturers. Indeed, by the 1990s the Japanese automakers were producing 
more than 2 millions cars a year inside the US.
 Sketching this larger history further emphasizes that “Fordism” was not a 
technologically driven historical stage but rather a socially constructed form of 
production that became deeply rooted in American mass production industries. 
Because the assembly line was a key element in US prosperity between 1914 
and 1974, Americans naturalized it as the best way to manufacture. The resulting 
corporate path dependency long blinded US managers to further improvements. 
They imagined, much like neo-Marxist historians, that the assembly line was a 
de inite stage, rather than one moment in a luid and ongoing process of development. 
They imagined that automation was the next stage. As often happens with process 
innovation, an outside group with a fresh perspective, in this case the Japanese, saw 
that automation was not the most ef icient way forward. They discovered that the 
assembly line could be vastly improved, doubling productivity with little investment 
in new machinery while actually reducing the number of workers. In short, not 
45 The years from c. 1920 until 2013 will be treated in my centennial history of the assembly 
line, MIT Press, 2013, forthcoming.
46 Utterback 1994, 145-166 and passim.
47 Slade 2006, 45.
48 Weiner, 1950, 154-159, passim; Noble 1984, chapters 1 and 2.
49 Simpson 1980.
50 Compare Faunce 1962 with Aronowitz 1973 and Sandler 1982.
51 Shimokawa 1993; Kenney and Florida 1993; Ortiz 2006.
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only was the assembly line the outcome of a century of increasing ef iciency before 
1913, it was also the beginning of further ef iciency improvements that still are 
accumulating. 
 In this light, the American assembly lines in Mexico, mentioned at the start of 
this essay, are not the future, but the past. They are a short-term strategy that allows 
American corporations to postpone conversion to lean production, substituting 
cheap labor on classic assembly lines for more expensive but more innovative multi-
skilled labor on lexible lines. Indeed, during the last ifteen years, lean production 
itself has already been surpassed, as “post-lean production” has cut automobile 
assembly time by a further 50%.52 Each “stage” is barely named before being 
surpassed by further process innovations. The assembly line in 1913 was neither a 
beginning nor an end, but rather part of a long series of innovations that began at 
least two centuries ago. As the classic Ford line approaches its centennial in 2013, 
the pace of this change is not slackening but accelerating. 
52  Wilson 2000; Maynard 2003.
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ABSTRACT
The Ford assembly line of 1913 was part of a long series of process innovations 
that began a century before and that have continued since, notably in the lean 
production system. This paper examines the historical emergence and synthesis 
of the ive essential elements of the classic assembly line – sub-division of work, 
interchangeability, single-function machines, organization of machines according 
to the sequence of assembly, and moving work to the worker, typically using gravity 
slides or moving belts – and further shows that full electri ication was an essential 
precondition for its creation and proper functioning. In contrast, “scienti ic 
management” was not important to the creation of the assembly line.
